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A b strac t: Worship is a topic th a t is rarely considered by philosophers of religion.
In  a recent paper, Tim Bayne and  Yujin Nagasawa challenge this trend  by offering an 
analysis of worship and  by considering som e difficulties a ttendant on the claim that 
worship is obligatory. I argue tha t their case for there being these difficulties is 
insufficiently supported. I offer two reasons tha t a theist m ight provide for the claim 
tha t worship is obligatory: (l) a divine com m and, and (2) the dem ands of justice w ith 
respect to  God’s redem ption of hum anity. I also challenge the soundness of som e of 
the analogies they employ in  their argum ent.
Philosophers of religion, unlike theologians, rarely treat the topic of wor­
ship in any detail.1 This neglect is particularly glaring in the case of religious 
ethics, where the claim that worship is an obligation receives scant discussion. 
Fortunately, in a recent paper, Tim Bayne and Yujin Nagasawa attem pt to defy 
this trend, inviting philosophers of religion to explore the topic of worship in 
more detail by providing a provisional analysis of the concept, and by pointing to 
some putative difficulties with the claim that worship is obligatory. Asserting that 
theists are committed to a strong claim about the obligatory nature of worship, 
Bayne and Nagasawa argue that this claim is unsupported, and that this presents 
serious difficulties for a theist.
My contention in the present essay is that their conclusion is itself unsup­
ported. Bayne and Nagasawa make their case by examining some reasons widely 
offered by theists for the obligatoriness of worshipping God. I present two reasons 
for worship unconsidered by Bayne and Nagasawa: (1) a divine command, and (2) 
a duty of gratitude based on the redem ption of hum anity by God. I then argue 
that their criticisms of attem pts to base an obligation to worship on the ‘ maximal 
excellence ’ of God fail because they do not take into account traditional theistic 
conceptions of God’s excellence. This failure to attend to the full implications of
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the theist’s insistence on God’s maximal excellence ultimately underm ines im ­
portant elements of their argumentative strategy.
The Bayne-Nagasawa account of theistic views of worship
Following a brief, but suggestive and well-informed, analysis of the con­
cept of worship, Bayne and Nagasawa offer an account of what appears to be the 
typical theistic view regarding obligations to worship. According to their account, 
theists hold the following two theses:
Reasonableness thesis (RT) Necessarily, it is reasonable for us to
worship God.
Obligation thesis (OT) Necessarily, it is obligatory for us to
worship God.2
In support of the claim that ‘most theists’ would accept the ‘obligation thesis’, 
Bayne and Nagasawa quote two prom inent philosophical theologians, Thomas V. 
Morris and Richard Swinburne (303). Bayne and Nagasawa also attem pt to m o­
tivate the distinction between these two theses by appealing to a further dis­
tinction between ‘what it is reasonable to d o ’ and ‘what it is obligatory to d o ’. 
They do not offer any more precise analyses of ‘reasonableness’ or ‘obligatori­
ness’. Instead, they present an example designed to generate the intuition that 
there m ust be some such distinction. They write:
As a parallel consider two positions one might adopt towards a work of art. Someone 
could refuse to admire Michelangelo’s David despite acknowledging that the David is 
the sort of thing that it is reasonable to admire. Similarly, one could admit that it is 
reasonable to worship God without accepting that hum an beings -  or any other beings 
for that m atter -  are obliged to worship God. (303)
In addition to helping us see that the two theses theists are allegedly committed 
to are actually different, this example is also supposed to lead us to accept a 
further claim, namely, that OT is not entailed by RT. Again, Bayne and Nagasawa 
do not offer m uch help the reader see why there is no entailment. Instead, the 
m atter is supposed to be intuitive. Indeed, they assert that ‘We can see no en­
tailment here’, presumably because there is no obvious entailm ent involved in 
the case of allied concepts like ‘adm iration’. The David case, in other words, is 
designed to motivate the intuition that, just because it is reasonable to do 
something, it does not follow that it is obligatory that one do something.
Since they deny that there is any entailm ent relation between these two theses, 
they conclude that the theist must, in order to assert OT, rely on some ‘truth- 
m aker’ (303). That is, there m ust be something that is the case that makes it true 
that ‘Necessarily, it is obligatory for us to worship God’. Clearly, given the m o­
dality of the claim, this m ust be something that is the case in all possible worlds. 
In the remainder of their paper, Bayne and Nagasawa explore ‘truth-m akers’ that
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have been proposed by various theists and conclude that none of them  provides 
the kind of support required by the strong obligation thesis. On their view, this 
suggests that theists, since they presumably hold the obligation thesis, face ser­
ious difficulties.
The principal issue raised by Bayne and Nagasawa is one that recent philoso­
phers of religion have not adequately addressed, namely, the issue of the justifi­
cation for claims that the worship of God is obligatory. Bayne and Nagasawa are, 
therefore, to be com m ended for bringing serious philosophical attention to bear 
on this issue. Worship is, after all, a hum an activity that is most characteristically 
religious. As such, it should occupy a prom inent place not only in phenom eno­
logical accounts of religious life, but perhaps more importantly, in philosophical 
accounts of religious ethics. In the following section of the paper, I will deal with 
this primary issue. At present, however, it is im portant to point out certain as­
pects of Bayne and Nagasawa’s presentation of this issue that are (at least po ­
tentially) misleading.
First of all, note the modality of OT; theists are alleged to hold that ‘ Necessarily, 
it is obligatory for us to worship God’. According to the widely accepted principle 
that ‘ ought implies can ’, the truth of statem ents about obligations depends upon 
that of further supporting statem ents about an agent’s capacities to carry out 
what is required by an obligation. For example, consider the following:
Admiration Thesis (AT) Necessarily, it is obligatory for us to admire
Michelangelo’s David.
The truth of AT depends upon the truth of statem ents about, among other 
things, the cognitive situation of individuals in every possible world. That is, a 
person m ust meet certain cognitive conditions (e.g. she m ust be aware of the exist­
ence of Michelangelo’s David, and m ust be capable of perceiving its aesthetically 
relevant properties) in order for it to be true of that person that she has an obli­
gation to admire the work. So similarly, the truth of OT depends upon the truth of 
statem ents about the various capacities of individuals in every possible world. 
The mere logical possibility of a person’s failing to m eet these conditions renders 
OT false. This is surely a possibility that ‘ most theists ’ would countenance.
At a later point in their discussion, Bayne and Nagasawa assert that 
‘ Presumably theists hold that any possible entity (apart from God) would have an 
obligation to worship God were it to be actual (and capable of worshipping 
God) ’(304). This does indeed seem to be a reasonable presumption. However, it is 
clearly not the same claim as OT, which simply asserts that ‘Necessarily, it is 
obligatory for us to worship God’. Bayne and Nagasawa would therefore have 
done better to attribute something like the following, more plausible, thesis to 
‘ most theists ’:
Modified obligation thesis (MOT) For any being with the capacity to do
so, it is obligatory to worship God.
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The current version of their argument, relying as it does on the apparently un ­
qualified OT, can be too readily rebutted by a theist. For, a theist merely needs 
to point out that, absent any clear qualifications or provisos, OT is obviously false. 
A theist need not worry about her inability to defend a manifestly false claim.
A second issue concerns the claim that RT does not entail OT. Certainly, the case 
of Michelangelo’s David does render this claim intuitively credible. Flowever, 
Bayne and Nagasawa weaken their case by failing to provide clarification of what 
term s like ‘reasonable’ and ‘obligatory’ mean. In the absence of such clarifi­
cation, the intuitive credibility of a claim derived from the case of Michelangelo’s 
David seems insufficient to ground any sweeping denial of entailment. For, one 
certainly could, and probably sometimes does, m ean with phrases like ‘it is 
reasonable to do A (where A is some action or pattern of actions) ’ that ‘ there is a 
good reason to do A. ’ And, on at least one widely held analysis of obligation, to 
have an obligation just is to have a good reason to do something.
Flowever, these issues notwithstanding, Bayne and Nagasawa certainly raise an 
im portant issue for theists. For, in claiming that it is obligatory to worship God, as 
most theists have traditionally done, and m any continue to do, theists have 
therefore committed themselves to the further claim that there is some reason or 
justification for the claim that we have some such obligation. Bayne and 
Nagasawa are surely correct in m aintaining that at least some account is owed by 
theists who hold this traditional view. It is to this crucial issue that I now turn.
Reasons for worship
While their discussion could be improved on several points, Bayne and 
Nagasawa are certainly correct in arguing that theists need to give some account 
of the obligatoriness of worship. That is, theists need to offer a reason for MOT. 
After presenting their case for this claim, Bayne and Nagasawa proceed to 
examine four possibilities, two of which seem to me to be more attractive than 
the others, namely the ‘creation-based’ account and the ‘maximal-excellence’ 
account.3 As m entioned previously, Bayne and Nagasawa judge that none of these 
putative reasons in fact grounds the claim that it is obligatory to worship God. 
They conclude that ‘ insofar as it is reasonable to think that the grounds of wor­
shipfulness would be scrutable to us, our inability to determine what those 
grounds could be gives us reason to call into question the claim that we have 
obligations to worship God’ (311- 312). They recognize, of course, that their argu­
m ents fall short of conclusively showing that there is no obligation to worship 
God (312). Still, readers are clearly m eant to draw the conclusion that Bayne and 
Nagasawa have presented a serious challenge to traditional views about worship.
My contention, however, is that, while Bayne and Nagasawa certainly present a 
case for the thought that worship should be given serious philosophical attention, 
they fail to offer a significant challenge to the claim that worship is obligatory.
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To see why, recall a point made towards the conclusion of the previous section. In 
their discussion of the relationship between ‘reasonableness’ and ‘obligatori­
ness’, Bayne and Nagasawa rely on likely reactions to the case of admiration for 
Michelangelo’s David. Certainly, it seems likely that a person’s intuitions might 
incline toward the thought that a person can think it reasonable to appreciate 
great art while she might simultaneously baulk at the claim that it is obligatory to 
appreciate it. Whether or not this thought is coherent is, however, another issue.
To show that it is, one would need to appeal to a theory of reasons that allows 
one to distinguish, for example, between ‘reasonableness’ as the absence of 
positive irrationality and ‘reasonableness’ as the possession of a compelling 
reason. Bayne and Nagasawa, however, do not rely on any such account. As a 
result, when it comes to their examination of putative reasons for worshipping 
God, they cannot make any a priori judgem ents about what could or could not 
constitute a sufficient reason of the sort required to constitute an obligation. 
Instead, they m ust approach the issue on a case-by-case basis. This, however, 
leaves them  open to the possibility that some other reason, not considered by 
them, could be offered by a theist for the claim that it is obligatory to worship 
God. Assuming that there are such reasons (an assum ption which will be made 
good below), it is not clear that Bayne and Nagasawa have presented any serious 
threat to traditional theistic views of worshp.
With these considerations in mind, it is apparent that theists have a perfectly 
good reason, of a broadly ‘deontic’ type, for worshipping God, i.e. the so-called 
‘Great C om m andm ent’. In its original formulation, the com m andm ent is ‘You 
shall love the LORD your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with
all your might....... The LORD your God you shall fear; him  you shall serve, and by
his nam e alone you shall swear’ (Deuteronomy 6.5 , 13)• Of course, the Great 
Com mandment does not explicitly mention worship. Still, theists maintain that 
worship is an activity that is expressive of the sorts of attitudes enjoined here, i.e. 
love, fear, and service.
According to one popular theistic conception of ethics, divine commands 
constitute reasons for action. In fact, on one particularly strong version of this 
conception, to say that someone ought to do something just is to say that God 
com m ands one to do it.4 The so-called ‘property-identical divine-command 
theory’ maintains that the property of being obligatory just is the property of 
being com m anded by God. The ‘ Great Com mandment ’ can be read as present­
ing, among other things, strong evidence that worship has the property of being 
com m anded by God. Thus, ex hypothesi, worship of God is obligatory.
Still, one need not appeal to this strong version of the divine-command theory 
to hold that the ‘Great Com m andm ent’ provides us with a compelling reason to 
worship God. That worship is indeed com m anded by God, who is a morally 
perfect being, and who therefore always wills the best, entails that worship be­
longs to the best. Assuming that we have an obligation to prom ote the best, it
470 B E N J A M I N  D.  C R O W E
follows that we have an obligation to worship God. In any event, theists clearly 
have at their disposal a consideration that is strongly in favour of MOT.
Another reason for worshipping God, of the sort that appears to constitute an 
obligation, is suggested by a remark made by Bayne and Nagasawa in their dis­
cussion of ‘creation-based’ accounts of the obligation to worship. Creation- 
based accounts rely on the claim that we owe God worship as the source of our 
being. As Bayne and Nagasawa correctly observe, these accounts rely on the idea 
that ‘we ought to be grateful to God for having been created, and we could only 
have reason to be grateful for having been created if we are benefited by our 
creation’ (305). That is, creation-based accounts of worship turn  on the idea that 
we can incur obligations in virtue of having been benefited by another person. 
Bayne and Nagasawa seem to grant this, for they go on to criticize creation-based 
accounts by raising the question of whether or not having been created is, in fact, 
beneficial to those who have been created.
However things m ay stand  on  this score w ith creation-based accounts of w or­
ship, it is w orth  pointing  ou t th a t the idea underlying th em  calls to m ind  an  
account of religion (which includes ‘ad o ra tio n ’ or ‘w orsh ip ’) offered by Thom as 
A quinas in his Sum m a theologiae. A quinas argues th a t religion is a moral (rather 
th an  a specifically theological) virtue connected  to justice. Justice m eans ‘fully 
rendering to  ano ther the  debt ow ed h im ’ .8 Thus, religion is a virtue of rendering 
God His due. A quinas m akes it clear th a t religion includes worship, bo th  as an  
attitude and  as a set of p a tte rn ed  activities .6 As for the grounds of this obligation, 
A quinas appears to accept bo th  a creation-based  account and  a maxim al- 
excellence accoun t.7
Setting these aspects of A quinas’s accoun t aside (for the m om ent, at least), bu t 
retain ing the basic though t th a t religion is a species of justice, ano ther account of 
the  obligation to worship, no t considered by Bayne an d  Nagasawa, com es to 
m ind. This account, w hich certainly figures prom inently  in  the  history of both  
Judaism  and  Christianity, m ight be called a ‘red em ption -based ’ account. The 
basic though t is that, since God has perform ed acts of incalculable benefit for 
hum anity, h u m an  beings are therefore obliged to  render God His due as far as 
they  are capable by w orshipping Him.
One a ttraction  of this account is th a t it does not face the principal difficulty 
raised by Bayne and  Nagasaw a for the  creation-based account. Recall that, by 
the ir lights, it is no t unam biguously  clear th a t bringing a person  into existence 
actually benefits tha t person. That is, existence by itself m ight no t constitu te  a 
good for everyone of the  sort th a t w ould render the  w orship of God obligatory. 
This suggestion certainly has som e intuitive plausibility. However, it does not 
seem  to apply to ano ther crucial action  of God, namely, His redem ption  of 
hum anity . To see how  this m ight anchor an  accoun t of the  obligation to worship, 
consider som e rem arks from  the Nativity serm ons of Lancelot Andrewes 
(1555- 1626), one of the  m ost im portan t theologians in the early developm ent
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of Anglicanism, and  a leading figure beh ind  the King Jam es translation  of the 
Bible.
Recalling a them e p rom inen t in patristic  authors, Andrewes focuses on  the 
im plications of the  Incarnation , the central claim  of Christianity, for h u m an  life 
here and  now. The ‘b o u n ty ’ of God, m anifest in  the Incarnation , consists in  the 
fact th a t ‘We are m ade the sons of God, as He the Son of m an; we m ade partakers 
of His divine, as He of our h u m an  natu re  [2 Peter 1 .14].’8 As early as Irenaeus of 
Lyons, theologians and apologists m ade use of the form ula ‘ God becam e a h u ­
m an  being so th a t h u m an  beings m ight becom e d iv ine’ to express the  soter- 
iological significance of the  Incarnation .9 Availing him self of the sam e thought, 
Andrewes th en  uses a further notion, w hich clearly com ports well w ith A quinas’s 
view of religion as a species of justice. Of the Nativity, Andrewes observes ‘ T hat as 
it is the tim e w hen  we from  God receive the fullness of His bounty, so it m ight be 
the tim e also w hen  He from  us m ay likewise receive the fullness of our duty . ’ 10 
O ur ‘ d u ty ’, in  this instance, includes specifically religious observances of the  sort 
constitutive of Christian w orship .11
Andrewes offers a parallel set of considerations in  his Good Friday serm on 
from  1605:
And He loving us so, if our hearts be not iron, yea if they be iron, they cannot choose but 
feel the magnetical force of this loadstone. For to a loadstone doth He resemble Himself, 
w hen He saith of Himself, ‘Were I once lifted up ,’ om nia traham ad Me [John 12 :32]. This 
virtue attractive is in this sight to draw our love to it.12
Here, Andrewes goes so far as to suggest th a t the spectacle of God’s suffering and 
death  naturally  evoke in us a feeling of obligation. Both in  the case of the 
Incarnation  generally, and  of the Passion in  particular, A ndrew es’s though t is that 
God has provided us w ith som ething unam biguously  good, such th a t we now  owe 
w orship to God. On the Christian hypothesis, redem ption  places h u m an  beings in 
the  best condition possible for them . While sheer existence m ay be of question­
able value for som e people, partic ipation  in divinity is surely not. Beyond this, 
however, the  concept of the Incarnation  entails th a t God Himself, the suprem e, 
incom m ensurable  goodness, becam e fully p resen t to and  available for hum an  
beings in a concrete, tangible m anner. Here again, there is no scope for am biguity 
regarding the goodness of w hat God has rendered  to hum anity. Thus, invoking 
the Thom istic idea th a t religion (which includes religious observance) is a part of 
justice, theists could respond to the issue raised by Bayne and  N agasawa by 
po in ting  ou t th a t God has benefited  hum anity  in  an  unsurpassed, indeed, u n ­
surpassable, m anner.
This p o in t leads naturally  to a consideration  of the  o ther prim ary ground for 
w orship considered by Bayne and Nagasawa, nam ely, G od’s m axim al excellence. 
Here, they have h it up o n  a though t th a t is central to Christian theism , and, in ­
deed, to m ost theistic religious system s. Again, one can  look to Irenaeus of Lyons, 
one of the  earliest Christian theologians, w ho attribu tes greatness to God on the
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basis of properties like moral perfection and power.13 Tertullian, who lived and 
taught several decades later, also expresses the notion of God’s supreme excel­
lence : ‘ In so far as hum an limitations can define God, this is my definition of his 
nature, a definition which will be adm itted by the general sense of m ankind: God 
is the supreme being, existing in eternity, unborn, uncreated, without beginning, 
without end . ’ 14
The Cappadocian Fathers, particular Gregory of Nyssa, also tended to ascribe 
‘unlim ited’ and ‘unrivalled’ beauty and goodness to God.15 Bayne and Nagasawa 
argue that maximal excellence fails as a ground for worship because the properties 
constitutive of it are shared with finite beings, and theists certainly do not regard 
us as having obligations to worship finite beings, no m atter how excellent 
they might be (307- 308). Thus, God’s excellence does not provide an obligation- 
constituting reason to worship God. Their argument on this score conforms 
to their general strategy throughout their paper of appealing to analogies with 
non-divine beings and our attitudes towards them  (recall the example of 
Michelangelo’s David discussed above). This is, however, precisely where they go 
wrong. The considerations offered by Bayne and Nagasawa fail to show that 
God’s excellence does not provide an obligation-constituting reason to worship 
God.
Consider again the passage from Tertullian quoted above, in which he qualifies 
his list of divine attributes by adding a statem ent about the limitations of hum an 
understanding. This is a qualification that figures into a broad range of authori­
tative theological positions. So Origen: ‘if there is anything that we are able to 
conceive or understand about God, we are bound to believe him  far superior to 
anything which we conceive ’ ,16 Similarly, while Gregory of Nyssa explicitly attri­
butes both beauty and goodness to God, he stresses that the beauty and goodness 
of God are incommensurably superior to those of created things, to the extent 
that they no longer really constitute the same properties. God’s beauty is ‘far 
removed from everything recognizable in bodies by the eye’, and His goodness is 
such that it is ‘impossible for such a thing to come within the scope of our 
com prehension ’ .17
Aquinas, who regards God’s excellence as a good reason to worship God, ar­
ticulates the implications of God’s supreme goodness for the nature of hum an 
worship. For Aquinas, the issue concerns whether or not the virtue whereby we 
render due honor to God is conceptually distinct from other virtues. He w rites:
The object of love is the good, but the object of honour is some type of excellence. God’s 
goodness is given to creatures, but the excellence of his goodness is not. Therefore, the 
charity by which we love God is not distinct from the charity by which we love our 
neighbour, but religion by which we honour God is different from the virtues by which 
we offer honour to our neighbour.18
For Aquinas, then, there is some sense in which God shares goodness with crea­
tures. What differs is the degree of excellence. God’s excellence is such that it
Response to Bayne and Nagasawa 473
canno t be shared w ith anything else. This seem s to  be ano ther way of m aking the 
po in t found in the  early patristic  au thors discussed above, namely, th a t G od’s 
goodness is incom m ensurably  superior to  th a t of anything else.
These qualifications im ply th a t no analogy is really adequate  for capturing 
the divine nature. Finite beauty, goodness, power, and  knowledge are sim ply 
inapplicable to God, no m atter how  m agnified these properties m ight be. So, it is 
no t the  case th a t God shares these properties w ith any finite thing. The fact tha t 
theists do no t th ink  it appropria te  to  w orship a good person, a pow erful person, or 
a  beautifu l person  tells us no th ing  abou t the  reasonableness of w orshipping God. 
It is no t the case th a t the  properties that, on classic the ists’ accounts, render God 
w orthy of w orship are properties th a t h u m an  beings (or anything else, for tha t 
m atter) could ever have. Origen likens the difference betw een the properties of 
finite beings and  God to the difference betw een  a dim, flickering candle flame 
an d  the sun. Both are certainly bright and  hot, b u t the  brightness and  heat of the 
sun  are incom m ensurably  greater th an  th a t of a dim  candle flame. Similarly, a 
good person  and  God are bo th  ‘go o d ’, b u t G od’s goodness is incom m ensurably  
greater to  such an  extent tha t we are no longer talking abou t the sam e property. It 
does no t follow, therefore, from  the fact tha t the  goodness of a h u m an  being gives 
us no reason  to w orship th a t person  th a t divine goodness gives us no reason to 
w orship God.
These considerations also provide fu rther reasons to be hesitan t about the 
strategy th a t Bayne and  Nagasaw a em ploy th roughout their paper. M uch of their 
case for the claim  th a t theists face problem s regarding the obligatoriness of 
w orship rest upon  an  analogy w ith a work of art, e.g. M ichelangelo’s David. The 
views just considered -  from  Tertullian, Origen, and  Gregory of Nyssa -  suggest 
th a t such analogies are a t best of lim ited value, and  at w orse are deeply m is­
leading. God and  M ichelangelo’s David  are such  th a t they  really canno t share 
properties in a way th a t w arrants conclusions abou t the properties of the  one on 
the basis of the  properties of the other. Thus, theists have a strong reason to  resist 
the  m oves m ade by Bayne and  Nagasaw a in the ir discussion of the  obligatoriness 
of worship.
Bayne and  Nagasaw a are to be com m ended for bringing the topic of w orship to 
the atten tion  of philosophers of religion. As one of the defining features of re ­
ligion as a way of life, it is indeed  regrettable th a t it has received so little a tten tion  
from  contem porary  philosophers. Their analysis of the  concept of w orship is bo th  
provocative and  suggestive, and  it clearly dem onstrates the necessity of 
phenom enological analysis to inform ed discussion and  debate regarding som e of 
the m ost im portan t topics in  philosophy of religion. At the sam e tim e, however, 
the ir claim  tha t significant problem s a ttend  theistic views of w orship is no t su p ­
portable as it stands. Since the ir fram ing of the issue forces Bayne an d  N agasawa 
to  adopt a case-by-case approach  to  putative reasons for w orshipping God, their 
argum ent is too exposed to any num ber of plausible an d  historically viable
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candidates for such reasons not considered in their paper. Moreover, their criti­
cisms of the maximal excellence account of the obligation to worship God, as well 
as many other elements of their discussion, fail to take into account the full 
implications of theistic views about the excellence of God. This significantly 
underm ines the force of major elements in their discussion.19
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